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Summary Critical psychiatry takes the position that ‘mental illness’ should not be
reduced to ‘brain disease’. Here I consider whether this particular stance is outdated
in light of more recent exchanges on reductionism, which consider questions raised
by new mental health sciences that seek truly integrative and specific
biopsychosocial models of illness.
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The anti-reductionist position of critical
psychiatry
According to Duncan Double, the essential position of crit-
ical psychiatry is that ‘functional mental illness should not
be reduced to brain disease’.1 As it stands, this claim is
ambiguous with regard to the basis of the normative (eth-
ical) prescription contained within it: why does critical
psychiatry maintain that we should not reduce ‘mental ill-
ness’ to ‘brain disease’? We are provided with a clue as to
Double’s view when he writes that ‘most psychopathology
is functional, in the sense that there are no structural abnor-
malities in the brain’.1 Accordingly, we should not engage in
such a reduction because we do not possess the evidence
that it can be done. To insist on this reduction, and on the
treatments and practices it entails, can therefore be con-
strued as ethically problematic. Now this sort of justification
for critical psychiatry’s essential position lands us in inde-
terminate territory: it relies on establishing the presence
of ‘structural abnormalities’, which depends on how we
define this term, on the state of the science and on the
nature of evidence and its interpretation. There will always
be claims and counterclaims as to the evidence for the bio-
logical basis of ‘mental illness’.
There is another more substantial argument that can be
provided in support of critical psychiatry’s position: we
should not engage in the offending reduction because even
if there were ‘structural abnormalities in the brain’, the sub-
ject matter – ‘mental illness’ – requires an altogether differ-
ent approach for its classification, understanding and
management. Double seems to intend something like this
when he argues, along with von Feuchtersleben, Meyer
and Engels, for a holistic, non-reductionist and integrative
conception of ‘psychopathology’. This is a valuable analysis,
and it is hard to disagree with the general direction of
Double’s argument in this regard: mental health conditions
cannot be understood, treated or managed through radically
reductionist concepts and approaches. And radical reduc-
tionism is the villain that critical psychiatry, on Double’s
account, is engaged in a fight with. It is a reductionism
that is so obtuse, it has no place for meaning, human rela-
tionships or social context. And it was certainly evident in
the early days of psychiatry, through the wild goose chase
prompted, in part, by the discovery of the celebrated causal
connection between general paresis of the insane and the
syphilis spirochaete. How far does this view exist today?
We can quarrel endlessly about critical psychiatry’s
representation of the views of its opponents, and it is
unlikely that we can ever resolve this to everyone’s satisfac-
tion. Instead, I shall introduce a more recent exchange on
reductionism, and from there we can discern where things
are at and what critical psychiatry has to say to us today.† See this issue.
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Towards a truly integrated understanding of
health
In a paper published in the BMJ in 2012, White and collea-
gues argue for an end to the distinction between mental dis-
orders and brain disorders in favour of a single overarching
category: disorders of the nervous system.2 One of the argu-
ments they make in support of this proposal is that psycho-
social factors ‘interact strongly’ with neurological disorders,
whereas ‘disorders of the mind are rooted in dysfunction of
the brain’.2,3 Psychological, social and biological causal and
risk factors run across all medical conditions, whether men-
tal or physical.2 If so, there might not be much sense insist-
ing on the distinction between mental disorders and brain
disorders, especially, they argue, considering recent
advances in the neurological and genetic bases of mental dis-
orders. Standing in contrast to White and colleagues’ pro-
posal is a position paper by Bracken and colleagues that
rejects the suggested equivalence between psychiatry and
neurology: ‘Psychiatry is not neurology; it is not a medicine
of the brain. Although mental health problems undoubtedly
have a biological dimension, in their very nature they reach
beyond the brain to involve social, cultural and psychological
dimensions’.4
These two papers, although they argue for opposite con-
clusions, are both non-reductionist in the sense that they do
not propose a radical disavowal of non-biological causal and
risk factors. Accordingly, neither falls foul of critical psychia-
try’s essential position as articulated by Double. A key point
on which they differ is a question of emphasis: White and
colleagues emphasise genetic and neurological factors,
whereas Bracken and colleagues emphasise psychosocial fac-
tors. Where should we stand on this point?
There is no doubt that mental health conditions and
neurological conditions demonstrate ‘multifactorial path-
ways’, as White and Colleagues note. Nevertheless, psycho-
social factors are more prominent in mental disorders
across a wide range of dimensions.5 To the extent that this
is the case, psychiatry differs from neurology in that it ‘has
particular expertise in the management of psychosocial fac-
tors as well as internal biological factors’.5 We could take
this observation to support the view that, in order to pre-
serve the emphasis on psychosocial factors, we should not
collapse the distinction between mental disorders and
brain disorders. Or we could decide that the terms of the
debate and the forced choice between them are out of keep-
ing with developments in the new mental health sciences.
Here, gene–environment interactions, social determinants
of health over the life-course, individual psychology and
neuroscience are all relevant for an integrated understand-
ing of health. As Derek Bolton puts it: ‘[These] new sciences
do not work with ideological battles between the biological,
the psychological, and the social, the old parallel universes
with poor communication between them; rather they work
with all of these factors and the diversity of interplay
between them’.5
There is much work to be done, both empirical and con-
ceptual, to understand how social, psychological and bio-
logical factors interact in specific conditions. However, that
work applies across the board to all conditions of
health-related interest.6,7 The aim is to move beyond a
biopsychosocial model that is integrative only in name and
towards one that can provide concrete risk and causal path-
ways across the range of factors of relevance to a particular
health condition.
Critical psychiatry may have run its course, but
the critique of psychiatry continues
Where does this leave critical psychiatry? Double’s editorial
seeks to advance two aims. On one hand, it wants to affirm
critical psychiatry’s continuing relevance as the defender
of the position that ‘functional mental illness should not
be reduced to brain disease’. On the other hand, it acknowl-
edges that it might be beneficial ‘to look for the continuities,
rather than discontinuities, with orthodox psychiatry’.1 On
the first aim, we have seen that it is possible to debate
whether we should end the distinction between mental disor-
ders and brain disorders without falling into the radical
reductionism that critical psychiatry positions itself against.
Moreover, as suggested above, the new mental health sciences
have moved beyond the terms of this debate and seek genu-
inely integrative and specific biopsychosocial models of health
conditions. Accordingly, in so far as critical psychiatry
requires the continuing relevance of its essential position,
then it might have run its course. This leaves us with the
second aim of the editorial, from which, on Double’s own ana-
lysis, one gets the sense that there is very little that separates
critical psychiatry from ‘orthodox psychiatry’. And that is not
a bad thing, for it can be taken by critical psychiatry as a tri-
umph, as evidence that its message has got through.
But critical psychiatry does not exhaust the constructive
critique of psychiatry and society, which, as we enter the
third decade of the 21st century, is going strong. For
example, there are continuing debates on the boundaries
of illness and on the definition of mental disorder (e.g.8,9);
there are attempts to resolve the classificatory complexity
of mental health conditions and to critique the validity of
existing classifications (e.g.10–12); questions continue to be
raised about the nature of mental disorders (e.g.13,14); con-
troversies remain surrounding the efficacy and risks of anti-
depressant and antipsychotic medications (e.g.15); debates
continue on the ethical complexities raised by capacity
assessments and coercive interventions (e.g.16,17); and chal-
lenges to medical concepts and approaches – to medicalisa-
tion more generally – are experiencing a resurgence through
mental health activism (e.g.18–22).
In the midst of these exciting and still largely unre-
solved problems, the version of critical psychiatry presented
by Double in his editorial is of historical value; it reminds us
of a radically reductionist position that now – in light of
developments in the science and philosophy of mental
health – appears false and outdated.
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